Concerning David Reiter’s Modal Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God

Comments

1. Mike Robinson says:

   January 6, 2012 at 2:28 pm

   • J Adam Johnson added the following comments on FB:

   ^Thanks for the post, I really appreciate your point that actual existence implies necessary existence; however, one objection comes to mind, if God is shown to actually exist and that existence implies His existence to also be necessary, then why should we use a transcendental argument at all? Maybe we could just use Platinga’s modal ontological argument and be done with it, since by demonstrating actual existence (with the ontological argument) we would also prove God’s necessary existence. Perhaps we cannot prove actual existence without first proving necessary existence, not vice versa.

   I also don’t like his beginning discussion of causality since I think it philosophically presumptuous to assume causality as an actual occurrence. Especially if you put weight in Zeno’s paradoxes, Hume’s criticisms of causality, and Edwardsian determinism (continuous creation), as I do. So I think this argument begs the question in one of the premise’s essential constituents. Perhaps it would be better to argue for the necessary appearance of causality through the necessity of inductive reasoning and then show God as necessary for this, rather than to start with such a highly debatable philosophical/scientific concept as causality in general.

   Despite these disagreements, I do agree with his critical analysis of Bahnsen through an approval of Choi appraisal of his argument. I am sure you are well aware that I am very critical of most TAGs for not proving the Christian God exclusively. Though I think the solution already exists in the Van Tillian camp with the Ontological Trinity as our transcendentally proven concrete universal, or, with John M. Frame’s innovative tri-perspectival approach.
   Yesterday at 9:00am • Like

   • J Adam Johnson: My last criticism is of the ’modal transcendental argument for God.’

   In approaching this new MTAG, I must also ask, is making a modal transcendental argument rather than a regular transcendental argument, really adding much of anything?

   Since the idea of a transcendental argument is that it is NECESSARY for human thought, why do we need modal reasoning to support or add further ‘necessity?’ Likewise, isn’t modal logic a little presumptuous?

   Perhaps modalism and possible world arguments should be more critically assessed before we jump into using them, since I see a lot of dangers in this sort of reasoning, especially in making deductions about God. Since I think categorizing God’s attributes as either accidental or necessary is border-line blasphemous and at odds with presuppositionalism. I have read of Ronald Nash arguing that we can imagine a possible world where God saved a different people than the Israelites, but in all worlds He must be omnipotent to be God. This makes me uneasy.

   God’s acts are His revelation of Himself and cannot be made separate from His essential character since what He does is a direct reflection of Himself. Likewise some have debated whether it is possible for God to be more wrathful or unloving in other possible worlds, or whether Christ could have been a woman in another possible world and still be Christ. This division of necessary and accidental properties, in my opinion, if applied to God, causes man’s reason to usurp the sufficiently of scripture and is a cause of unedifying speculation which is more arbitrary than rationally grounded. We can argue for necessity without modalism simply by showing something as necessary for our everyday experience.

   So I guess I see the MTAG as at best unnecessary and at worst presumptuous. Not to mention that it does no better job in proving the Christian if it does not show the necessity of the Trinity.
   Yesterday at 9:03am • Like
   •
   J Adam Johnson: ‎*it does no better job in proving the Christian GOD…

   Reply
2. Mike Robinson says:

   January 6, 2012 at 2:31 pm

   Kris commented the following on FB:
   ^ • Kris Gemmer: What’s up Mike. Have you ever read James Anderson’s paper in response to David Reiter’s paper concerning TAG. Reiter offers a Stroud-esque criticism concerning the ‘modal problem’ of TA’s. Anderson argues that if the ‘transcendental premise’ involves a necessary precondition of the validity of human thought, then the TAG’s conclusion does in fact establishes the logical necessity of God’s existence. Do you think Anderson’s contention, if you agree with it, addresses Reiter’s claims in the above linked paper.
   20 hours ago • Unlike • 1
   •
   Kris Gemmer: Hey Mike. I keep reading your link (since I can’t find Reiter’s online). When he contends that any TA concluding the necessary existence of God must be composed of propositions expressing only “necessary truths”. By “necessary truths” does he mean a transcendentally necessary precondition of intelligible experience (i.e l
   17 hours ago • Unlike • 1

   Reply
3. Mike Robinson says:

   January 11, 2012 at 4:33 pm

   ^ J Adam Johnson “Thanks for the post, I really appreciate your point that actual existence implies necessary existence; however, one objection comes to mind, if God is shown to actually exist and that existence implies His existence to also be necessary, then why should we use a transcendental argument at all?”
   —
   Mike: The actual existence of God was established First by the TA and then I argued that actual in touching God, also denotes the necessary existence of God.
   * I would like to explore his employment of the term actual; I maintain that when discussing God as actually existing, it seems to point toward God necessarily existing.

   • God is an actual given in a possible world W if, and only if, He has complete omnipresence in W; and
   • God is omnipresent if He has complete presence in every possible world.
   • Omnipresence is possibly exemplified. That is, it is possible that there is a God who has omnipresence.
   • Therefore, possibly it is necessarily true that an omnipresent God exists.
   • Thus, it is necessarily true that an omnipresent God exists.
   • Therefore, an omnipresent God exists.

   When one perceives how the argument works, you might think that asserting or affirming the premise is tantamount to asserting or affirming the conclusion; the astute atheist may assert that he does not believe it is possible that there is a God. But could not a parallel criticism hold of every valid argument? Take any valid argument: after you perceive how it works, you may think that asserting or affirming the premise is tantamount to asserting or affirming the conclusion.
   If there are things that transcend the material realm, including God, necessarily; a necessary entity cannot be grounded by a contingent world or series of worlds. In contrast, non-theism rests upon a contingent world or worlds. Consequently non-theism lacks the necessary endowment to underwrite necessary truths.

   It would appear that Reiter is maintains that TAG establishes God is necessary only in this world within strict modal constraints, not all possible worlds.

   ————————–
   ^ J: I also don’t like his beginning discussion of causality since I think it philosophically presumptuous to assume causality as an actual occurrence. Especially if you put weight in Zeno’s paradoxes, Hume’s criticisms of causality, and Edwardsian determinism (continuous creation), as I do. So I think this argument begs the question in one of the premise’s essential constituents. Perhaps it would be better to argue for the necessary appearance of causality through the necessity of inductive reasoning and then show God as necessary for this, rather than to start with such a highly debatable philosophical/scientific concept as causality in general.
   —
   Mike: I argue: since causality is a condition for intelligibility only God can account for such. The chief question concerning causality is “not just the function of causality, but” what is “the ground of its intelligibility” (Don Collect: Speaking the Truth in Love).
   What is the ontic bedrock that furnishes the rational pre-essentials to make the concept of causality intelligible? God.
   ————-
   ^ J Adam Johnson: In approaching this new MTAG, I must also ask, is making a modal transcendental argument rather than a regular transcendental argument, really adding much of anything?
   —
   Mike: Reiter thinks so and argues that it is required to establish God’s necessary existence. Purchase the article from link in my article.
   Cocnerning Plantinga’s OAEG: it seems impregnable, but not accepted by many and it doesn’t depend on the Triune God.

   Reply
4. Mike Robinson says:

   January 11, 2012 at 4:51 pm

   ^ Kris Gemmer: “ What’s up Mike. Have you ever read James Anderson’s paper in response to David Reiter’s paper concerning TAG. Reiter offers a Stroud-esque criticism concerning the ‘modal problem’ of TA’s. Anderson argues that if the ‘transcendental premise’ involves a necessary precondition of the validity of human thought, then the TAG’s conclusion does in fact establishes the logical necessity of God’s existence. Do you think Anderson’s contention, if you agree with it, addresses Reiter’s claims in the above linked paper.”
   –
   Mike: I like Anderson’s arguments and I did argue for an aspect of what JA contends (see the original post of mine)
   ————–
   ^ Kris Gemmer: Hey Mike. “I keep reading your link (since I can’t find Reiter’s online). When he contends that any TA concluding the necessary existence of God must be composed of propositions expressing only “necessary truths”. By “necessary truths” does he mean a transcendentally necessary precondition of intelligible experience (i.e )”.
   –
   Mike: It seems to be more of an ontological claim using modal concepts since epistemic claims rest on ontic truths and both presuppose one another; there is an inseparable symbiotic dependency. between ontology and epistemology.
   It seems that an issue is made between necessary in all possible worlds or necessary exist contingently within strict modal constraints.
   Did you get the Journal yet? What do you think?

   Reply
5. Kris Gemmer says:

   January 15, 2012 at 11:25 am

   Mike,

   That was a very interesting way to respond to Reiter’s claims concerning a TAG moving, fallaciously, from ‘actual’ to ‘necessary’ existence. One line of criticism I thought might be offered as well would be to point out that Reiter’s assumed analysis of the concept of ‘necessary’, in terms of an ‘all possible world’ analysis’, is subject to much criticism by contributors to ‘the epistemology of modality. However, even granting Reiter’s use of ‘necessity’ (or ‘necessary’), what exactly would be the price a TAG pays by reaching the conclusion that God necessarily exists, only by constructing the argument in terms solely of “necessary truths”? For instance there are many necessary truths, that are also transcendental preconditions of intelligible experience (i.e. categories of logic and mathematics, etc…). So if we formulate the TAG in terms of say the law of non-contradiction, would it not avoid Reiter’s evaluation. As well, since his challenge (until it would most likely end up in a Barry Stroud-esque ‘modal problem of TA’s'), is purely formal, why not just formulate every transcendental premise so that it expresses necessity (what Reiter ends up doing)? When he claims “The overall conclusion of our discussion is that a TA intended to establish the necessity of God’s existence must be purely transcendental—i.e., it must be composed exclusively of necessary truths”, what force exactly does he intend this to have? That an argument which concludes the ‘necessity’ of God’s existence, must rest on premises expressing ‘necessity’, is a very uninteresting point. Barry Stroud’s critique of Strawson would then come into play, the sceptic can always hold that intelligible predication merely assumes ‘that it need only appear to us that X must be the case, for predication to be intelligible, without X really being the case’ (challenge the transcendental premise, or any in which we claim ‘necessity’ in relation to Reiter). However, one line of response, mentioned by Robert Stern and adopted by me, is to challenge Stroud’s assertion. The best way to do this, I think is to formulate a TAG in terms of a ‘performative transcendental argument’. Adrian Bardon explains, “A well-founded PTA shows that the skeptic‟s communication of her claim demonstrates its falsity.
   Such conclusions can always be disputed, but to do so the skeptic may be forced to abandon
   some other deep theoretical commitments; PTAs have the effect of setting up this sort of
   dilemma in a particularly direct and poignant way”. This would also speak to, what I take to be, the most formidable challenge to the legitimacy of any TA. Namely, Choi’s recapitulation of Stephen Korner’s challenge that’ just because a worldview is a sufficient condition for X, it doesn’t follow that it is a necessary condition of X’ (The challenge of a uniqueness-proof of any worldview. Although Butler does offer some possibilities in terms of Donald Davidson’s work). Taking any TAG as a PTA, maintains its strength, in that, if a non-Christian thinker, in order to warrant the validity of human thought, must, in principle, either abandon their current worldview and become a ‘Fristian’, or accept the Christian position, then a valid TAG is still a pretty strong Christian Theistic argument.

   Reply
   • Mike Robinson says:

     January 15, 2012 at 1:28 pm

     Kris: thanks for the thoughtful response. I’ll ponder it and reply Monday.

     Reply
   • J Adam Johnson says:

     January 15, 2012 at 2:42 pm

     Kris,

     I really appreciate your view on actuality not necessarily implying necessity and I would agree it is a fallacy in most instances; however, if we were to prove the actual existence of God, and God is Who He says He is, wouldn’t He also be necessary? I think so, and this is of course based on the fact that some fallacies are not valid in regards to every form of argument (consider the circularity criticism in regards to axioms, worldviews, and necessary preconditions for intelligibility). In contrast, my criticism is that we cannot prove God’s actual existence except by demonstrating His necessity, a reason why I feel all proofs must be rejected except the TAG. Because all other proofs are by nature either probabilistic, do not account for the issue of worldview interpretations, or are not proofs of the Triune God specifically.

     Also if you read my previous criticism on this article that Mike posted earlier, I think you will find that I agree with you completely that modal reasoning is highly suspect. Excellent analysis on this point, kudos.

     >>Just because a worldview is a sufficient condition for X, it doesn’t follow that it is a necessary condition of X.<<

     In regards to this one famous criticism of TAGs, isn't this where the ad reductio absurdem aspect of presuppositional apologetics comes in? God's existence is shown as sufficient and therefore necessary, BECAUSE unless another worldview can argue necessity the same way (sufficiency), than it stands that the Christian worldview is not only sufficient but actually necessary. Hence why presuppositionalists critique opposing worldviews and do not simply regurgitate TAGs.

     In response to your PTAG suggestion, I think it is a little silly to say that the TAG/PTAG is 'pretty good' because it leaves either fristianity or Christianity. Why not make an exclusively Christian-Trinitarian TAG like Van Til envisioned or like Frame is alluding to in his tri-perspectivalism and remove Fristianity out of the list of options? This seems to be the prevailing weakness in every TAG if have every seen public debates, instead of following what men like Van Til formulated, they instead argue for the existence of some vague notion of 'all-knowing' deity. Such a deity being one that is equally acceptable in not only all apologetical schools, but also in various other religions (such as Islam). Thoughts?

     Reply
     • Kris Gemmer says:

       January 15, 2012 at 3:40 pm

       [Actually to J Adam Johnson] Mike.

       I agree, a TAG that escapes the ‘sufficient, yet not logically necessary’ challenge (demonstrating the uniqueness of the Christian worldview as the only sufficient basis for intelligible predication), is certainly far better than a more moderate formulation. I also think that you’re on to something very essential when you point out Van Till’s emphasis, elaborated upon by Frame, that only the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, which provides a ‘Personal Absolute’, provides the preconditions of intelligibility. You’re definitively correct, in saying against any actual worldview, the Christian position alone provides a rational basis for human thought. I guess the Korner/ Choi contention is that just because no actual worldview other than Christianity can account for the transcendental preconditions of intelligible experience, it does not follow that no, maybe unknown, worldview can (of course it would have to be identical to the Christian worldview in almost every aspect, hence Choi’s ‘Fristianity’ thought experiment). Maybe, as you mentioned, and I tend to agree, the problem with concluding the necessity of the Christian position from it’s sufficiency is actually a problem concerning the epistemology of modality (that is, what sense does it make to talk about a ‘non-actual worldview’ providing the actual preconditions of predication, required in being able to assert the proposition of the ‘non-actual’ worldview. So maybe, you’re right that uniqueness (‘necessity’ in this context) follows from the fact that the Christian worldview ‘actually’ provides the necessary preconditions of meaningful predication. Thanks man.

       Reply
       • Mike Robinson says:

         January 15, 2012 at 9:42 pm

         Kris: the previous response given was from J Adam Johnson and not me. It appears like you may have thought it was from me.

         1. I’m going to respond to both you and J Adam Johnson in a whole new post on Mon or Tues
         2. If you can, you can use and expand your previous comments into an article and I will post it here.
         blessings,
         mike

         Reply
6. Kris Gemmer says:

   January 16, 2012 at 6:48 am

   Mike and Jay. I apologize, I thought the last post addressing my last post was
   Mike, but it was Jay. Upon learning of my error I te-read Jay’s comments and
   and, it seems to me, that certain contentions offered by Jay are fallacious,
   Jay,
   You state that your criticism (I don’t know whether you were referencing my
   post or Reiter’s paper, either way it seems flawed):

   “We cannot prove God’s actual existence by demonstrating his necessity”.

   Really? If something exisists neceessarly (thinking here of metaphysical necessity), then it would
   seem to exist actually. For my point we can utilize the ‘possible worlds’ account of necessity (though I applaud your recognition that there are issues in modal epistemology that certainly need be addressed
   in terms of Reiter’s, Stroud’s, Choi’s, Korner’s, etc… critiques TA’s which rest strongly on possible problems of their use of such a conception). However, it seems uncontroversial that if
   something exists necessarily (in the sense most contributors to modal epistemology, or technical oncology, would classify as metaphysical), then it certainly exists
   actually. The proposition that 2+2=4( I’m substituting ‘truth’ for ‘actual’, though it should be obvious they mean the same thing in this context. Any actual state of affairs is true, you just need to assert the proposition representing the state of affairs [just being technical and pointing out that only propositions have intentionality and are thus bearers of truth]), being necessarily true, entails that it is actually true. ( it should be obvious that is a proposition is true in all possible worlds, must be true in the actual world (or actually true/ exist. I’m a mathematical realist, so I hold that numbers actually exist [I would contend math is a human expression of truths about God's nature]). However, going the other way (your idea that God’s actual existence rather than his necessary existence is what a TAG should aim to demonstrate), the situation is not symmetrical. Just because something actually exists, it does not follow that it necessarily exists (of course Mike’s insights may point to an exception in the case of God. Though I still take it that his comments on the matter were to the effect of securing the necessary existence of God in the conclusion of a accurate TAG). However, it still seems absurd that we should argue for God’s actual existence instead of the necessary existence of God ( in passing necessity in this context is, though maybe slightly related, prmarily distinct from the notions of probable involved in non-TA theistic arguments). If something necessarily exists, the probability that exists is trivial (like asking how probable it is that ‘all bachelors are unmarried). I’m just pointing this out because proclamation of why you take only TAGs to be appropriate theistic arguments, seemed to allude to the idea that necessity made an argument probabilistic. I’ll address some other issues after work.

   Reply
7. Kris Gemmer says:

   January 16, 2012 at 7:06 pm

   Jay.
   I wrote the last entry on my ipod, needless to say touch screen typing is not my specialty I noticed that some of my grammar is so atrocious as to make certain statements unintelligible. First let me apologize to Jay, I quoted misquoted you (unintentionally I assure you), you stated that ” prove God’s actual existence except by demonstrating His necessity”( on the ipod I didn’t see “except by”). You are spot on here, my above comments are irrelevant. Sincerest apologies Jay.
   However, Concerning your remarks about the Korner/ Choi-esue criticism of TAs , namely that even if a worldview is shown to be sufficient for intelligible predication, it does not follow that it is necessary. Your contention that, “God’s existence is shown as sufficient and therefore necessary, BECAUSE unless another worldview can argue necessity the same way (sufficiency), than it stands that the Christian worldview is not only sufficient but actually necessary…” is just as restatement of the point that Korner, and Choi are challenging, not a response (or even intimation towards one). “Unless another worldview can argue necessity the same way (sufficiency)”, misses the whole point of Choi’s “Fristianity” thought experiment, that of offering a possible worldview which is also sufficient for providing the preconditions of intelligibility. A worldview exactly like the Christian worldview, except there is one God who exists eternally in four persons. What is needed to answer the challenge is a uniqueness proof, or a rebuttal in terms of errors involved in their reasoning, in order to escape the consequence of adopting an attenuated TAG, not a re-assertion of the notion being challenged (I must remark when you assert that, “God’s existence is shown as sufficient and therefore necessary, BECAUSE unless another worldview can argue necessity the same way (sufficiency)…”, it’s hard, without being totally uncharitable, to think that you really meant to state such a thing. You have not at all given reason, or even a suggestion, as to how “necessity” follows from “sufficiency” ( in fact this is the fallacy that Korner and Choi are pointing out, the move from sufficient to necessary [or unique]). Sadly, your claim is blatantly fallacious. However, I do think you are onto something when you refer to the possibility of a fallaciously self-referential problem involved in the Korner/ Choi critique (the ‘reductio ad absurdem apect’ of a valid TAG), though it is hard to state our apparently shared intuition on this point, concerning what exactly is going wrong with the Korner/ Choi challenge. I am inclined to think that the problem pertains to the modal concepts in terms of which the dilemma is being advanced in terms of (the assumed position concerning ideas dealt with in the study of modal epistemology, that are far from uncontroversial, and safe from criticisms). Specifically, (1) the seeming lack of consideration that, concepts of modality are ‘world-view’ dependent, and thus what “possible worlds” one takes as possible is already determined by one’s ultimate presuppositions. (2) The legitimacy of challenging the transcendental necessity of an actual worldview, via a non-actual worldview, where the transcendentals of experience rests on the actual worldview being challenged (of course, it’s not apparent how to respond to the Choi-esque approach in the manner I’m here addressing).
   As well, your suggestion that “presuppositionalists critique opposing worldviews and do not simply regurgitate TAGs”, seems to be at complete odds with the point you are trying to make (also, this approach to critiquing actual worldviews is exactly what a PTAG as I hinted at accomplishes. It also demonstrates God’s existence as ‘necessary’, in the sense relevant to Reiter’s ‘Stroudian objections’). Your contention that a PTAG is the wrong approach to take, instead of “an exclusively Christian-Trinitarian TAG like Van Til envisioned”, is a statement to the effect that, ‘a Van Tillian TAG, exclusively demonstrating Christian-Trinitarianism, does not critique the various actual competing worldviews opposed to Christianity, but rather proves Christian-theism exclusively’, the notion you objected to approximately 2 sentences earlier, “presuppositionalists critique opposing worldviews and do not simply regurgitate TAGs”. Regarding a PTAG, you’ve offered no warrant to the effect that (1) a PTAG as I’ve hinted at is distinguishable from any TAG Van Till ever actually formulated [regardless of the CLAIMS he made concerning the conclusions of such formulations]. Prima faci, it would seem obvious that if there were a TAG formulated in Van Till’s works that conspicuously( or even inconspicuously) demonstrated the exclusivity of Christian-theism, the Korner/ Choi criticism would’ve been addressed very quickly (I would guess that thinkers like Butler, James Anderson, certainly Bahnsen… know Van Till’s work extensively, and would offer just such an argument, likely pointing out how Van Till had demolished the aforementioned criticism 70 years or so ago). Of course, Van Til may have formulated such a version of TAG, those considered top ‘Van-Tillian-pressuppositionalist-scholars might just be missing it, or just not yet fully appreciated certain propositions entailed by other statements made by Van Till. Or, Van Till never fully articulated such a formulation of a TAG, yet there is such a formulation intimated at by Van Till (I would be inclined to think this the most likely). In any case if you know of such a formulation I would suggest you write a paper forwarding this version of a TAG (or e-mail the main ideas to me, and I’ll write the paper and take the credit Before shutting up I must point out that I, nor any presuppositionalist I’ve ever read, seen debate, heard in a lecture, etc…, have even made remarks from which your statement that, ” instead of following what men like Van Til formulated, they instead argue for the existence of some vague notion of ‘all-knowing’ deity”, could be derived, or even mistaken for motioning towards. A PTAG certainly would not at all implicate such a notion, nor have you offered anything resembling a reason why you think it would (failing to provide even the slightest attempt to address the Korner/Choi objection, save a MAYBE relevant, assertion of a possible self-reference problem, you haven’t given any substantial criticism of a PTAG). For that matter, you haven’t presented any warrant to the effect that a PTAG is not a TA equivalent in strength to any formulation Van Till actually advanced (regardless of his claims concerning what he accomplished. In your second paragraph, regarding the way a TAG commences, you presented it in a ‘Performative TAG’ fashion).

   Reply
8. J Adam Johnson says:

   January 17, 2012 at 9:38 am

   Wow, uh….I don’t know where to start, lots of confusing remarks especially since tone and content changes so much from post to post. Well I guess I will try to copy this all to a word document and respond when time warrants it. It seems most of the ‘contention’ against my posts, where consistently addressed, are matters of mere misunderstanding, so most of my response will likely be making points of clarification.

   Reply
9. J Adam Johnson says:

   January 21, 2012 at 7:59 am

   I am going to respond in a short, concise, and pointed manner since I think endless paragraphs that run together can be a little overwhelming. Likewise I don’t want to be cited as using verbosity. I hope after these clarifying points, that we will find ourselves in a more-or-less agreement on these matters and that we can proceed on a more productive foot. In these points, I feel I addressed the bulk of your contention against me, and that any one of your objections would fit under the various points below. If I have missed anything, please just let me know. Likewise, in order to prevent more overwhelmingly long posts, could you please ask me questions in a more socratic fashion, instead of targeting a perceived error and bombarding it with ten paragraphs of dialogue? I would REALLY appreciate it, I am very busy right now with school, wife, kids, selling my house, working full-time, and trying to get a new house to start seminary. I really don’t have time to sift through extremely long posts for hours at a time.

   I mean all of this with both gentleness and sincerity.

   1. In regards to the Korner/Choi objection of necessity v.s sufficiency of TAGs and my response of an Ad Reductio Absurdem method, I want to point out that I was defending Presuppositionalism more broadly on this, not TAGs specifically. This being the case, the Korner/Choi objection stands in regards to the TAG as isolated syllogism; however, when it comes to the Presuppositional argument as a whole, especially as it is presented in a debate, I think necessity can be established from sufficiency when the Ad Reductio Method is used by the apologist in his negative argumentation.

   I apologize for not making myself clear on this point, I was not speaking of TAGs narrowly, but Presuppositional argumentation broadly on this point. This was my fault.

   2. I also want to point out a contention I have against the Korner/Choi objection. This contention of mine did not come out clearly in my last posts, but it was definitely a factor in much of my thinking.

   This contention is that the Burden of proof is on those opposing a Transcendental argument, since a transcendental argument is, by virtue of its definition, an argument of necessity not sufficiency. What this entails for men who would use the Korner/Choi objection is that they would have to use a positive method as opposed to a negative method, hence they would have to prove their worldview as being equally sufficient/necessary in order to disprove the exclusive necessity claim implicit in a Transcendental argument. This is similar to the mutiple religious claims criticism against most TAGs, the burden of proof is not on the one using the TAG.

   This is also why I am critical of modality arguments, because if a Transcendental argument is by definition an argument of ‘necessity for intelligibility,’ than a modal argument is at best unnecessary and at worst presumptuous.

   3. I also want to point out that I never critiqued the PTAG directly, I would just argue that it would be unnecessary if we used an exclusively Trinitarian TAG.

   So when I object to your PTAG suggestion as the solution to the Korner/Choi criticism it is because I perceived a PTAG as adding additional methodical aspects to an already faulty proof (not being Trinitarian). In essence, unless a PTAG is identical with my point that we need to make an exclusively Trinitarian TAG, then I see it as simply adding zeros to zero, you still get zero, or in this case, a failed proof for the exclusive necessity of the Christian God. Only a TAG that proves the existence of the Triune God as revealed in Scripture alone will fulfill this present need in Presuppositional Apologetics.

   Lastly, a couple more clarification points, and then a question.

   1. When you see an apparent contradiction between my defending Presuppositionalists for using ad reductio methods with their TAGS and my stating that we need to have a Trinitarian TAG later….I want to stress that there is not a contradiction, let me explain;

   I was first defending against the korner/choi criticism (see my first point under the previous heading), that Presuppositional apologists do show necessity from sufficiency by adding ad reduction absurdum arguments along with their tags in negatively critiquing opposing worldviews, this combined with the fact that the burden of proof is one the opponent to show that a TAG only proves sufficiency, makes even the faulty and inefficient methods (in not being exclusively Trinitarian) of current Presuppositionalists, still pretty solid.

   In then stating that we NEED a Trinitarian TAG is not only, in my opinion, a better alternative than a simple PTAG (unless PTAG is exclusively Trinitarian by definition?), but it is also a far more efficient way of arguing in that it eliminates much of the extra ad reductio negative methods that Presuppositionalists employ along with their current TAGs (does this make it a PTAG?).

   Hopefully you understand this better, that I was not contradicting myself, but perhaps this was also more of a fault attributable to my lack of clarity and organization. Apologies here as well.

   2. I do, however, want to make a couple or remarks about you later objection about the non-usage of the Van Tillian TAG against the Korner/Choi objection.

   It seems to me, that it is a little fallacious to assert that if such a proof like the exclusively Trinitarian TAG really existed, we would have seen it by now in use against the Korner/Choi objection; which is essentially your point when you stated;

   >>it would seem obvious that if there were a TAG formulated in Van Till’s works that conspicuously( or even inconspicuously) demonstrated the exclusivity of Christian-theism, the Korner/ Choi criticism would’ve been addressed very quickly (I would guess that thinkers like Butler, James Anderson, certainly Bahnsen… know Van Till’s work extensively, and would offer just such an argument, likely pointing out how Van Till had demolished the aforementioned criticism 70 years or so ago).<<

   This erroneous reasoning is a variation of the post hoc fallacy, but I’m not here to play the fallacy name game. Let me just say this, that Van Til wrote extensively on the ontological Trinity and his understanding of this concept is well documented by various Presuppositonal scholars (especially Bahnsen in his “Van Til’s Apologetic Readings and Analysis,” and Frame’s book on Van Til.)

   Likewise, Frame’s recent work on Tri-Perspectivalism (which primarily presented in his book in the Lordship series called “The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God”) is ground-breaking, but has not been widely received in the Presuppositional world and has had almost no translation into TAGs. This is unacceptable in my opinion.

   I have attempted, in my debates, to use exclusively Trinitarian arguments (Mike can attest to this, and recently I have begun to move from Van Til’s ontological Trinity argument to Frame’s Tri-Perspecitvalism because I discovered flaws even in Van Til’s ‘one and many’ argument for the Trinity and feel that Frame is closest to bringing us to the ultimate elimination of the Korner/Choi objection.

   The only thing we have to do now, is avoid the cum hoc criticism by demonstrating that Triune God causes Tri-perspectival knowledge and is not merely a coincidental false correlation.

   I would LOVE to correspond with you on developing an exclusively Trinitarian TAG where we BOTH would get the credit. In fact I have a connection with John Frame through a close friend at RTS Orlando, so maybe we can some of his first-hand opinions on some of these matters. My personal email is joshjohnson447@yahoo.com, and you can call me on my home phone which is 814-345-5168, which I would prefer for our first conversation.

   3. In regards to you stating that you have never heard Presuppositionalist use the faulty arguments I am referring to, I would ask you to show me a debate where the TAG used was an exclusively Trinitarian TAG?

   Anything else is a proof of something other than the Christian God, a vague notion of deity or existence of a self-sufficient knower at best (you can actually see this first hand in Bahnsen‘s appendix on the necessity of a Revelational epistemology in his posthumous book, Presuppositional Apologetics; Stated and Defended.”).

   Reply
10. Kris Gemmer says:

    January 30, 2012 at 10:10 pm

    Jay,
    I appreciate your kindness. I’m sorry if I came off sounding contentious. I am grateful for our correspondence; it has led me to the start of more focused thinking and study in the area of modal epistemology. It seems to me that the supposed problems critics raise regarding the validity of concluding the necessity of God’s existence from the demonstrated sufficiency of God’s existence (when criticizing TAGs), is directly linked to a certain modal concept they are presupposing, namely ‘necessity’ cashed out via a ‘possible world’ analysis (which you have correctly pointed out as well). Relevant to the question of the validity of an exclusive TAG, is that such a modal notion is itself understood in terms of ‘conceivability’. However, this, prima facie, appears to assume the legitimacy of autonomous human reason. This is exactly what you and I as presuppositionalists challenge any non-Christian epistemology on (maybe, when time permits, we could exchange ideas on the issue, and together come up with a more exact articulation). Here are the questions I have respecting your last post. Sorry it took me so long. If this is a dead issue to you, and taking up too much time, I understand and wish you blessings:

    (1) Concerning the Korner/Choi type challenge, which I think we could paraphrase as the claim that ‘a TAG erroneously concludes the necessity of the Christian God’s existence as the precondition intelligible experience, from the sufficiency of The Christian God’s existence providing these preconditions’:

    (i) You say the challenge is dealt with in that, “necessity can be established from sufficiency when the Ad Reductio Method is used by the apologist in his negative argumentation”:

    (*1) How is the criticism in discussion reduced to absurdity at this point? Maybe I’m not grasping the thrust of what you’re getting at. I wholly agree with you that, if the objector (the one advancing the aforementioned challenge) holds a worldview which does not provide a ‘personal absolute’ (along with you I believe the only one that does exist, and the only one presented by any actual worldview, is Yaweh, the Triune God of the Bible), then via a TAG we can refute the objectors professed worldview via a reductio ad absurdem. As well, we certainly can show that the Christian worldview does afford a sufficient basis for the required characteristics of intelligibility. However, what makes the ‘objection’, not just the ‘objectors worldview’ susceptible to a reductio? Wouldn’t we be equivocating at this point between the fact that the objector cannot provide the preconditions of intelligibility in terms of her non-Christian worldview, with the claim that ‘demonstrating the sufficiency of the Christian worldview, does not entail the necessity of the Christian worldview’? For example, say someone who advances this criticism responds, “I grant that my worldview cannot provide the preconditions of meaningful experience, and I grant that the Christian worldview does. However the world is just as the Christian thinks, save God is one being eternally existing in four persons instead of three (Choi’s challenge). Being one God who exists in multiple person hoods (thus being a self-contained, personal absolute, in which ‘universality and particularity are equally ultimate’ [as Van Till would say]) this God provides the necessary preconditions of experience as well. Thus, the Christian, Triune God is certainly a sufficient condition of intelligibility, yet not a necessary condition”. Is there something logically incoherent going on here? Maybe I’m missing the point of your contention that we can address the challenge via “Ad Reductio Absurdem method”. If you have something different in mind, than what I’ve sketched above (my interpretation of what you seemed to be advancing), I would love to hear your proposal (I mean that earnestly).

    (ii)When you state, “the Burden of proof is on those opposing a Transcendental argument, since a transcendental argument is, by virtue of its definition, an argument of necessity not sufficiency”:

    (*1) As it stands it seems we would just be begging the question against objectors like Korner and Choi. Their contention is that a TA never can show the necessity of its conclusion, because actually showing its conclusion provides the required prerequisites of meaningful predication (sufficiency), it doesn’t show the exclusivity of its doing so (necessity). Even if it is granted that a TA, by definition, is an argument that shows its conclusion necessary, without a uniqueness proof (one possible approach would be to demonstrate that only a trinity of persons in the Godhead accounts for meaningful predication, an “exclusively Trinitarian TAG”), then all that follows is there is no valid formulation of a TAG as you’ve defined.
    Finally:
    (1) I’m sorry for attributing any errant self contradiction to you respecting what you meant by an “exclusively Trinitarian TAG”, and the approach of refuting actual worldviews (I was being lazy, and not recognizing you’re transition from discussing a TAG in context of the specific challenge, and discussing a TAG in general). I’m in total agreement with you my friend, that an ‘exclusively Trinitarian TAG’ would show the necessity of The Christian Worldview, and provide what I’ve been calling an ‘exclusivity proof’ (in short, overcome the Korner/Choi type criticism). I should’ve been clearer on what I was calling a PTAG (Perfomative Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God). I just meant a TA that refutes a specific skepticism, challenging the illocutioner to abandon her actual presuppositional conceptual scheme (like naturalism, or Buddhism). It would be a weaker conclusion than a TAG that demonstrated the necessary existence of the Triune God of Scripture; you’re completely right in this observation. What I meant by a PTAG, is simply that a TAG still demolishes any actual worldviews which are relevant to a real apologetic debate (even if it turned out the Korner/Choi challenge was insurmountable). The attenuated PTAG, wouldn’t argue for a bare theism, it would content itself in demonstrating: (a) The sufficiency of the Christian worldview in providing the preconditions of predication, whether or not it answered the ‘sufficient, but not necessary’ criticism. Also, (b) demonstrate that any actual worldview (i.e. naturalism) cannot provide such preconditions, and thus is refuted via a reductio.
    (2) Again here, I apologize for apparent contention in my remarks about contemporary Van Tillians concerning an answer to the Korner/Choi objection. You’re absolutely right that Van Till would often formulate his TAGs referencing the ontological trinity as the only foundation upon which intelligible predication was possible (I just don’t think Van Till ever addressed the ‘sufficient/necessary’ challenge we’ve been discussing [other than merely stating a TAG in such a way as to claim the necessity of the ontological trinity]). He was aware of a cruder form of the criticism. I believe that the author of, “Once Upon An A Priori”, was at least intimating at the main point of the challenge we’ve been discussing (I want to say the paper was authored by Carnell, though I’m not sure). I love Frame (and Van Till for that matter), “DKG”, is one of my favorite books of all time, I would be indebted to you for drawing out frame’s insights in connection with an exclusivity proof, something you’re seemingly catching and I’m not.

    Aside from what may be some important disagreements, I think it’s safe to say we’re in accordance on much concerning a TAG (if an exclusively Trinitarian formulation, in substance not just word, which you may be onto, can be offered I concede the Korner/Choi critique is defeated). Whenever you have time, I too would love to work together as you mentioned. I think there is a shared intuition between us, that the specific challenge to a properly formulated TAG which we’ve been discussing is surmountable (at this point it seems you’re on to something I’m likely missing, so as you might just need to teach me a bit, which I have no qualms about). My, very much still in the beginning stages, idea, is to attack the “possible worlds” analysis of the modal notion of necessity and argue for a “counter-factual” conception of ‘necessity’ (ala Saul Kripke), which wouldn’t invoke ‘finite human conceivability’ as a salient, defining feature. I hope to hear more from you Jay, if not in this forum, in some other. I would also be interested in obtaining your debates if available.

    Reply
    • J Adam Johnson says:

      February 2, 2012 at 9:12 pm

      I will be responding when time warrants.

      Reply
11. J Adam Johnson says:

    February 8, 2012 at 9:13 am

    Kris,

    I am glad we are on the same page for most of this stuff, and now that I have you on facebook, I am sure we can do more dialogue there on the stuff we agree on in moving towards developing an exclusivity proof. Therefore, I am only going to address your two concerns as mentioned in your last post.

    1. Your first question is in regards to my statement that necessity can be established from sufficiency through an apologist’s negative argumentation.

    To clarify my meaning on this, I am stating that during a debate over the existence of God, a Christian apologist has his positive and negative arguments. His positive arguments are seen in his ‘proof’ which is the TAG in question. In response to this, a non-Christian will typically deny the validity of the proof and then attempt to establish his own worldview. The Christian apologist will then proceed to negatively critique his opponent’s worldview (this being the point I am trying to make.)

    What happens in such a case is that he establishes the sufficiency of the Christian worldview in providing the preconditions for intelligibility through his proof, and then shows the necessity by dismantling his opponents worldview through a negative critique of his opponent (ad reductio absurdem). Therefore the refutation of his opponent is what makes the sufficiency move to necessity, for by dismantling his opponent’s system he shows that only the Christian worldview is sufficient, which would then mean it is necessary. This is how it is has been done in theory and practice by Christian apologists.

    What you seem to be implying in your PTAG is a proof that encompasses both this positive and negative argumentation in a single ‘proof.’

    I personally don’t know how this is possible except by an exclusivity proof. Which I am working on.

    Your hypothetical objection however, is valid and I have faced it in the field of debate. I have heard certain shameless skeptics admit that the God of Christianity does sufficiently provide the preconditions of human thought, but not necessarily, and they did this through the example of a quadrinity etc. This is a failure of TAGs and not a failure of Christianity as I am sure you agree. What needs to be done is to develop an improved Trinitarian TAG that corresponds the God in the proof to the God in the Bible. If this is done in a syllogism, it will be the proof to end all proofs, and the only possible rejection must be a rejection of the correspondence to scripture. Which would be fine, since in rejecting the testimony of Scripture while not being able to deny the necessary existence of a Triune God, an unbeliever shows themselves self-condemned.

    2. Your second concern is in regards to my claims that the burden of proof lies on the one making the sufficiency v necessity claim against the Christian apologist.

    I do not think that this argument is begging the question on the part of the apologist. The main reason I say this, is because the apologist’s counter to the objection against necessity, is that the objection is arbitrary without demonstration in virtue of the fact that a TA is by definition an argument of necessity. Therefore, the Christian apologist is forcing his opponent to make good on his claim by proving it via demonstration. The only way that an unbeliever can do this is by showing that their worldview can also sufficiently provide the preconditions for intelligibility, or that another hypothetical worldview can do so.

    I do agree that this has no actual bearing on the fact that we still need an exclusivity proof, but it at the very least, will force the unbeliever to demonstrate his claims and therefore be on the defensive. This gives the Christian apologist the edge in being able to defend his TAG through negatively critiquing his opponents.

    Reply
12. Kris Gemmer says:

    February 10, 2012 at 5:16 pm

    J.
    Since we’re corresponding on FaceBook now, and you sent me the outline for your TAG which incorporates Frames insights (that any intelligible experience assumes the three, mutually dependent elements that you point out), I have a much clearer idea of what you were referring to as an “exclusively Trinitarian TAG”. I think your invocation of Frame’s “Tri-perspectivalism”, as applied to the context of a TAG is phenomenal. I’m not going to get into it here (since we’re communicating on FaceBook), I’m going to try to write you tonight on that (I think it’s a fantastic project). Let me just comment on a few points regarding your last response.

    (1) You state that, ” Therefore the refutation of his opponent is what makes the sufficiency move to necessity, for by dismantling his opponent’s system he shows that only the Christian worldview is sufficient, which would then mean it is necessary”.

    (i) I’m with you all the way regarding:
    (a) That we can definitely give a negative critique of all ‘actual’ non-Christian worldviews.
    (b)That we can by TAGs establish the Christian worldview as a sufficient condition if intelligibility.

    It’s obvious that we haven’t responded to Korner’s objection at this point. We have only shown the sufficiency of the Christian worldview. However, once you formulate the TAG (of which you sent me the outline), I believe you will have overcome it. So now that I know what you have in mind by an “exclusively Trinitarian TAG”, I grant that if such a TAG is cogent (I think it is), then you will have overcome the ‘sufficient but not necessary’ objection. I think our hang up is that I disagree with the idea of that, ‘the reductio performed on a particular worldview, in conjunction with demonstrating the sufficiency of the Christian worldview, entails the necessity of the latter. I do think that the negative reductio, with the conjunction of the TAG your working on does demonstrate the necessity of Christianity though. So, in light of the TAG your working on, the problem fades away (since your giving an exclusivity proof).

    (ii) Your description of the PTAG in your last post is for the most part accurate. It’s the “negative” reductio conjoined with the “positive” demonstration of the Christian worldview as a sufficient condition of intelligible experience. It seems to me that a TAG does both in the “same proof”, yet we can only articulate one element at a time, in the way you mentioned above (when discussing the ‘sufficient/necessary issue). I think the reductio of non-Christian worldview ‘A’, is not a seperate argument, just a way of looking at a TAG from the view point of the “negative” aspect. Actually, you describe the PTAG I had in mind better than I did, when you say,

    “I do agree that this has no actual bearing on the fact that we still need an exclusivity proof, but it at the very least, will force the unbeliever to demonstrate his claims and therefore be on the defensive. This gives the Christian apologist the edge in being able to defend his TAG through negatively critiquing his opponents”.

    All I meant to add, by the consideration of understanding a valid TAG (one which only demonstrates sufficiency, and doesn’t answer Korner’s criticism {I grant that the TAG which you’re developing would make a PTAG irrelevant of course}, would still be an invaluable apologetic for Christianity.

    Reply

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1. Colossal Collection of Many Fine Essays on Frame’s Academic Contribution says:

   May 20, 2012 at 3:36 pm

   [...] • Wayne Grudem • Richard Pratt • Paul Helm • Vern Poythress • Bruce Waltke (resigned from RTS due to his defence of “scientific evolution.”) • William Davis • William Edgar • Peter Jones • Reggie Kidd • Don Collett (his chapter is his third published revision of his essay on Van Til’s TAG) * Frame’s most recent reply to Collect’s defense of the Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence (TAG). See my analysis of Reiter’s update on TAG: http://thelordgodexists.com/2012/01/concerning-david-reiter%E2%80%99s-modal-transcendental-argument-… [...]

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