If Everybody Gets Stoned It’s not Actually Everybody!
And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being (Genesis 2:7).
One problem for strict atheistic materialism is its failure to account for enduring personal identity over time; since the body undergoes constant intrinsic material change.
Ponder the following case:
- Tom gets high smoking pot at night.
- Tom is not high the following morning.
Under strict atheistic materialism Tom has undergone real change in his personal identity.
Within the ontological structure of materialism one is not able to classify that Tom is the one and the same person when high in the evening and sober the next morning. When Tom is high he is filled with material chemicals from smoking weed which changes the material structure of his body (as would food or liquid intake–or a big haircut!).
i. Tom-high is high while filled with material chemicals from smoking weed.
ii. Tom-sober is not high.
But Tom-high and Tom-not-high are assumed to be just substitute names for Tom. Yet in order for Tom to have not changed in his personal identity, it would have to be the case that Tom-high = Tom-not-high = Tom.
Thus, it apparently follows that under atheistic materialism:
iii. Tom is both high and not-high.
However, being high and not high are mutually irreconcilable properties. Accordingly, the materialistic atheist view of personal identity involves a contradiction: it implies that one and the same thing can be both t and not-t, for some property t.
The problem of materialistic atheism’s ontological stance and personal identity is produced by the presupposition:
1. For any h and t, if x is, was or will be t, then x is t.
If Tom is stoned at one time and not-stoned at another, then Tom is stoned and not-stoned; but being stoned and being not-stoned are mutually incompatible; hence, materialistic atheism’s view of personal identity over time, due to incessant intrinsic material change, involves a contradiction.
Owing to its denial of an immaterial aspect of personal identity (soul/spirit), atheistic materialism fails to account for enduring human identity over time.
Relentless Physical Change and Enduring Personal Identity
When someone says I am “Tom,” and he means he is the same “Tom,” as the person that is in his high school yearbook named “Tom,” he is borrowing from the Christian worldview. Christianity can give us a reason to be certain we are who we are from moment to moment; atheistic materialism cannot. Our physical body changes every hour and every day. Human beings lose one-sixtieth of an ounce of respiratory moisture and sweat every minute. There is a net loss every second. This means humans physically change every moment, hence under a physical-only worldview, I am not the same person I was a second ago.
The skin replaces itself once a month. The stomach lining is replaced every five days. The cells in the liver are replaced every six weeks, and the skeleton about every three months. The body of every human being constantly changes. The cells of a human body are in a constant state of flux, and are always being modified. In one year, the average person has ninety-eight percent of his atoms exchanged for new ones. In seven years’ time, every atom in a person’s body has been replaced by new ones. Thus the person is a new and completely different being, within the worldview of the materialist atheist (quicker if you get multiple body piercings).
“If the world were not as scripture says it is, if the natural man’s knowledge were not actually rooted in the creation and providence of God, then there would be no knowledge… The non-Christians have made and now make discoveries about the state of the universe simply because the universe is what Christ says it is. The unbelieving scientist borrows or steals the Christian principal of creation and providence every time he says that an “explanation” is possible, for he knows he cannot account for ‘explanation’ of his own” (Greg Bahnsen).
Who Was the Guy at My Wedding Next to My Wife?
The atheist who maintains that only the physical world exists is claiming that nothing spiritual or immaterial exists; this includes an enduring immaterial soul. Without an ongoing immaterial aspect of personhood, after seven years, everyone is a different person. So the atheist cannot account for personal identity. By his standard of a physical-only world, everyone is a different person after seven years because every physical atom has been swapped for new ones. If we consist of only physical matter, and are devoid of a soul, under the atheistic physical-only view, after our bodily atoms were completely exchanged for new ones, we would be different people.
The atheist, under his worldview, is not married to the woman he married nine years ago. They are totally different physically, due to the complete exchange of bodily atoms after seven years. If he has a child over the age of seven, under the atheist’s ontological position, the kid is not the same child that was born to them. Therefore, if he wanted to be consistent in his worldview, he should throw away all his baby pictures and their wedding album. Every molecule in his body has changed. And under a hard material-only worldview, he is a different person. Yet, he will not do that since he is tacitly basing much of his life on the Christian worldview.
The atheist husband still hugs his wife without being unfaithful to her, since Christianity is true. He will still take his kid to the park and buy him a balloon. But he will not buy the unknown kid who is next to him a balloon. The atheist knows that his child is the same child who was born to him years before because he has an enduring soul; a soul the Christian worldview maintains; hence the atheist lives much of his life upon the Christian worldview.
And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear Him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell (Mathew 10:28).
Can the information in one’s DNA be the basis for personal identity? No, since twins (and clones) have the same DNA but they are two different individuals. Additionally, even though it is highly improbable, two or more distinct men can have the same DNA and yet remain totally different individuals.
You Aren’t What You Eat
Under atheism, can the solely future Tom, and the solely present Tom, as well as the solely past Tom be the same person?
No.
Atheistic materialism makes no ontological provision for enduring personal identity over time since men in flux will have different material parts and composition with dissimilar material properties.
Next time your atheist friend tries to take a large bite of his Big Mac, stop him with the warning that he is, not only damaging his health, he is changing his identity with each bite. Bon Appetit.
That He [God] would grant you, according to the riches of His glory, to be strengthened with might through His Spirit in the inner man (Ephesians 3:16).
And Never get high on dope, instead read my new E-book: Ontology: Studies in Christian Thought and Apologetic Applications HERE
or the paperback Truth, Knowledge and the Reason for God here
Your thoughts and comments are encouraged:
Mike. Excellent insights. The title is worth its weight in gold
OK. Let’s try this for a third time, since you still haven’t addressed my points about this elsewhere:
• Tom gets high smoking pot at night.
• Tom is not high the following morning.
Under strict atheistic materialism Tom has undergone real change in his personal identity.
Only if you take “identity” to mean “every aspect of your composition at any given moment”. By that standard, indeed, every time you eat something, your identity changes.
But that’s not a useful standard of identity.
Does the act of getting high change Tom? Possibly. Does every day change each one of us, even if only a little bit? To me, the answer is clearly “Yes.” Does that mean I am some completely new person each day? Of course not. Tom(monday) is not completely identical to Tom(Friday) — but neither was Tom(10 years old) completely identical to Tom(21 years old).
Similarly:This means humans physically change every moment, hence under a physical-only worldview, I am not the same person I was a second ago.
If people change in increments of 1/1×10(27), that’s a change I’m willing to accept as being “different”. I don’t think that’s too much to ask. We clearly do change, as people, while remaining the aggregate of what we have been before.
You’ve repeated the following several times, and never addressed my critique:
So the atheist cannot account for personal identity. By his standard of a physical-only world, everyone is a different person after seven years because every physical atom has been swapped for new ones. If we consist of only physical matter, and are devoid of a soul, under the atheistic physical-only view, after our bodily atoms were completely exchanged for new ones, we would be different people.
You refuse, repeatedly, to address the question of pattern, and of structure. From the materialist viewpoint, a carbon atom in the same place as a different atom does not change the greater structure. It’s a carbon atom. We are the greater structure in which they are contained. That structure changes over time, just as people do. But it is not a complete replacement of personality, as you seem to imply — it’s a palimpsest.
To try a different metaphor, to see if this one sinks in — a wave in the water is made up of different H2O molecules as it passes through the water — but it is identifiable as a single wave.
People are waves, moving through the physical world; identifiable, but changeable — continuous, yet made up of different parts as they move.
It appears that you feel your *description OF Identity change = no Identity change. The depiction of ID change that you posit cannot solve the materialistic ontological problem that a man cannot be the same man 7 years later w/i materialistic atheism. The recountal you offer not only is ontically unappealing, it only supports the contention that strict materialistic atheism fails to account for enduring personal identity over time.
cannot solve the materialistic ontological problem that a man cannot be the same man 7 years later w/i materialistic atheism.
OK. I think we have a severe sorites problem here.
What does it mean to be “the same person” 7 years later? Because the model I’ve given as far as I can see explains perfectly well both the changes and continuities one would expect.
I don’t think there’s a simple, unalterable, unchanging “identity” — which is the thing you feel material processes (and please note the last word there) cannot account for. However, even if there were (for so long as one was alive), the *process* can remain constant while the materials involved in it change — hence the wave analogy.
If you’re exactly the same person you were 7 years ago, I feel sorry for you; it means you’ve not grown, or learned, or developed at all.
The recountal you offer not only is ontically unappealing
Whether or not it appeals has nothing to do with its sufficiency.
it only supports the contention that strict materialistic atheism fails to account for enduring personal identity over time.
See above, regarding “identity change”. Identities change, and endure.
(As a side note — I realized the other thing that might be going on here, and it ties back to some of our previous arguments. The materialist answer to the question about “Who Was the Guy at My Wedding Next to My Wife?” is “Me, back then — I’ve come to be who I am now through a clear process.” Similarly, my child is my child because I knew them then, and I understand the processes to get them here. But when we were having our discussion regarding logical foundations and accounting, it became clear that induction is not something you’re willing to grant to the materialist — while it’s exactly what a materialist uses to establish personal identity — person X at time T is person X’ at time T’, and unless the processes in the middle lead one to expect a massive change, person X’ will resemble person X (and share memories, etc.), so we might as well call them the same person.)
Steven since u tend to be straightforward and measured you acknowledge:
“I don’t think there’s a simple, unalterable, unchanging ‘identity.’”
-And that’s the focal thrust of my post. Your assertion apropos my question “’Who Was the Guy at My Wedding Next to My Wife?’ is ‘Me, back then — I’ve come to be who I am now through a clear process’” — Seems to be merely begging the question and restating the problem by tacitly acquiescing to my theistic solution w/o explicitly conceding so.
And do you maintain that abortion is a homicide?
what do u think of Kris’ arguments or J’s in their exchange – comments on the Reiter’s Modal TA post – I’d be interested in your thoughts.
hope all is well with you my friend,
mike
“I don’t think there’s a simple, unalterable, unchanging ‘identity.’”-And that’s the focal thrust of my post. Your assertion apropos my question “’Who Was the Guy at My Wedding Next to My Wife?’ is ‘Me, back then — I’ve come to be who I am now through a clear process’” — Seems to be merely begging the question and restating the problem by tacitly acquiescing to my theistic solution w/o explicitly conceding so.
You missed the point of my comment regarding sorites, it seems.
Who you were when you were three is not who you are when you’re 30 — at least, I hope not. “The child is father to the man” — Wordsworth. Identities do change — and yet, there is a clear way in which they also endure.
There are material processes that explain how I came to be who I am from who I was; these operate at a much higher level of organization than the mechanics of cell replacement. You seem not to be willing to accept that there are levels of structure there, hence our problem.
I’ll have to go look at the discussions on the modal argument — the “reposted-from-facebook” made it hard to follow.
With all due respect, this seems to be a rather simplistic, reductionist philosophy. You seem to presume that enduring identity must somehow be linked to a soul concept provided to you by Christian literature. The truth of Christianity aside, enduring identity is the result of what is known as a bio-psycho-social interaction which produces a personality influenced by both DNA and the environment. Science cannot be simplified by saying “all of the atoms and molecules will be new in 7 years”. That is not doing justice to the complexity of biological life. Neuroscience has a principle of replication in the same sense that skin and hair does; or will in seven years my hair cease to be curly and my skin cease to be yellow? Personal identity, whether we can grasp it or not, is developed and deeply embedded by and in the growth of our physiological, material features. Whether a God-being, a personified agent and a religious faith is relevant to that personal identity is another issue.
Incorrect. Perhaps you can reread the post and discuss the issue: no human has the same matter enduring thru time.
Science cannot be simplified by saying “all of the atoms and molecules will be new in 7 years”. That is not doing justice to the complexity of biological life.
no human has the same matter enduring thru time.
Sorry, Mike, but you’re the one who’s not doing the reading, or at least not being responsive to it.
You still haven’t answered my point above regarding processes — which are a part of the material world — versus individual molecular mechanics, which I suspect is what David is pointing at.