Reason Requires God: Kant’s Transcendental Program Fails

In Christ are Hidden All the Treasures of Wisdom: Kant’s Transcendental Program Falls Short

By Mike Robinson

Introduction

Immanuel Kant maintained that men can know rational truths through a synthesis of human sense perception and reason utilizing man’s intellectual autonomy. He attempts to discard God as the proper foundation of human reason. Additionally, he rejects scripture as the ultimate means to know that sense perception is generally dependable. There are operational features of experience men presuppose in order to offer critical analysis; men come to analytical pursuits with some embedded understanding—background assumptions that make rational examination possible. Without presupposing the existence of God, one cannot account for analytic assessments. Linguistic truths and communication utilized within critical analysis would be impossible without the biblical God since analytical ventures utilize immutable universals which God grounds. One source of Kantianism insufficiency: it cannot account for the essential operational features of reason, thus it lacks explanatory power to account for critical analysis.

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Don’t let anyone capture you with vain philosophies and high-sounding nonsense that come from human thinking, … rather than from Christ (Colossians 2:8).

Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given. We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus’ primary hypothesis. Failing of satisfactory progress in explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved round the spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest. A similar experiment can be tried in metaphysics, as regards the intuition of objects.1

imageskaKant names his theoretical system “transcendental philosophy.”Kant’s transcendental idealism may have shaken the world, but in principle, it is arbitrary. This is the case since his Copernican revolution rests upon subjective human autonomy. The fatal flaw within Kant’s thought is the idea that the “knowledge transaction with respect to nature is complete without any reference to God.”3

Kant produced some valuable insights from his critical analysis (the epistemic need for the preconditions of operational features within human experience) but his scheme folds because he reposes his whole system upon ideas antithetical to scripture. “Van Til tells us that the very essence of knowledge is to bring our thoughts into agreement with God’s revealed Word.”4

Kant’s “Copernican revolution” was his doctrine that “objects must conform to our knowledge,” which seems to mean that certain basic features of the objects of our knowledge are due to the nature of our human cognitive faculties. We can know the world only “as it appears” to us; we cannot know it “as it is in itself.” The world as we experience it, the world of “appearances,” is thoroughly imbued with the forms of our perception (space and time) and the forms of our thought (the categories—the logical forms of judgments). The world as it is in itself may not be spatial or temporal… This “transcendental idealism” shook the foundations of all previous philosophy, and the reverberations have been felt ever since, not least in contemporary philosophical debates about realism and idealism.

Kant maintained that we can know the principles that come from a type of synthesis of forms of human empirical sense and reason within man’s own rational autonomy. He rejects the very ground of human reason (God) and the means to know that human sensual functions are generally reliable (scripture).

Kant’s Moral Theory Miscarries

Kant’s moral metaphysic lolled upon human reason while he disregarded the Ten Commandments as God’s revelation and moral foundation. “As a preliminary to a Metaphysics of Morals … there is, to be sure, no other foundation of [moral] metaphysics than the critical examination of practical reason.”6 Kant attempted to ground universal moral duties on human reason. Nevertheless, human reason is flawed and disputable in contrast to God: the only possible source of universal moral duties. God is the unflawed one who indisputably knows all things. Kant again reveals his dependence on human autonomy whereas he values human dignity for the reason that men can obey only “those laws which they make themselves.”7 Kant’s ultimate maxim rejects God’s revealed law, for a man “ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law.”8 This is subjective and one can hold this in a relativistic manner as well. Most importantly the maxim ignores the truth of the Decalogue as it attempts to place men on a throne that decrees universal moral duties.

An important feature of Kant’s Copernican revolution maintains that the preconditions in the mind are required for the apprehension of the diverse phenomena of human sense experience. But Kant posits nothing with the ontic clout that can ground the preconditions obligatory for reason inasmuch as he “makes man the ultimate source.”9

While Kant declared that the moral law within is compelling proof of God’s existence, he rejected the moral imperative to attend church and worship God in community. He ignores religious duties inasmuch as “Kant radically rejected the idea of authoritative revelation from God and asserted the autonomy of the human mind … The human mind is to be its own supreme authority, its own criterion of truth and right.”10 Consequently Kant aims by the authority of pure reason to allow believing faith in the noumena. This appears to be a way for a rational source to rent reason from faith; an idea that today has almost universal appeal for secularists and occultists.

Kant and Man’s Autonomy

Van Til offered this analysis: “Although Kant professed a kind of theism and an admiration for Jesus, he was clearly far from orthodox Christianity. Indeed, his major book on religion (Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone) has as its chief theme that the human mind must never subject itself to any authority beyond itself. Kant radically rejected the idea of authoritative revelation from God and asserted the autonomy of the human mind perhaps more clearly than had ever been done before (though secular philosophers had always maintained this notion). The human mind is to be its own supreme authority, its own criterion of truth and right.” Kant falls as he posits the fallible and deficient human mind as the organizing source of intelligibility.

Kant’s practical philosophy leaves with this fundamental, thought-provoking ambiguity between the hope for gradual social amelioration, with the corresponding resolution to contribute to it, and a more religious viewpoint that sees our only ultimate hope in divine grace, given to us in so far as we acknowledge our finitude and our faults and resolve to be better human beings as best we imperfectly can.11

Kant has certain noble goals in epistemology, ethics, and social science but his program fails since it rests upon borrowed Christian capital (selected ethical goals; language, culture, etc.); capital that Kant not only comingles within his scheme, but makes it depend upon human autonomy.

Kant seems to suggest that human experience is intelligible because of the ability our own minds alone. Frame observes: “Kant argues that what makes our experience intelligible is largely; perhaps entirely, our own minds. We do not know what the world is really like; we know only how it appears to us, and how it appears to us is largely what we make it out to be.”12 Thus men do not really know what things are like—we only know how things appear to be.  Consequently human reason supplants God as the creator and organizer of the world and human experience.

God Reigns in Epistemology

“Heinrich Heine called Critique of Pure Reason an executioner’s sword, a destructive, world-destroying thought.”13 However the all-powerful God reigns and He rules over everything including knowledge and epistemic pursuits forasmuch as “the Lord God Omnipotent reigns…” And His is “Faithful and True,” and “out of His mouth goes a sharp sword, that with it He should strike the nations.”14 This battering includes all error and epistemic inaccuracy.

In contrast to Kant’s program, to truly know truth is to presuppose God in all our thinking. Men must honor God’s word as more important and more certain than any other truth (John 17:17). All law and rational criteria that knowledge requires are found in God revealed in the Bible (Colossians 2:3). God has universal power, position, and rule—and He provides the required a priori verity state of affairs for the universal laws of reason.15 This is an impregnable truth from a web of immutables, necessities, and universals that is unified and accounted for by Christian theism.

Carnell draws the applicable antithesis: “It is safe to conceive that Christianity and Kantianism are diametrically conceived for, whereas the latter looks upon motives that appeal to the ego as wholly unworthy and immoral, the former is founded squarely upon an appeal to the ego.”16 With their overlooking of God in the knowledge field, in principle, Kantians must adopt positions that disallow certainty, necessity, and universality. In the end, they must surrender not just the laws of reason, but epistemology, ontology, ethics, and everything in human experience—that which Kant strained to rescue.

Kantianism cannot justify universals, immutables, and necessities; and most factions do not seek such. Christian theism offers the rational man the foundation for the possibility of making assertions, even an assertion against Yahweh. Considering that the Triune God is the only possible epistemic ground, He is the lone source for immutable universals that are utilized in all assertions. The ground necessary for assertions must supply the explanatory power sufficient for general principles, unchanging laws, and universal operational facets of human rationality and intelligibility. The God of the Bible has these ontic credentials. Even the discussion of His existence presupposes that God lives. Without God, one cannot account for the laws of reason used in any conversation regarding the existence of God.

An ultimate epistemic criterion that has the explanatory power sufficient for general principles, unchanging laws, and universal operational facets of human thinking cannot be overturned merely by appeals to experience. It deals with the required pre-environment to make experience intelligible. The laws of logic are necessary to make experience coherent; yet one cannot appeal to experience to underwrite them, since experience is in constant flux. In contrast, the laws of logic are inviolably constant. Intelligible experience presupposes the laws of logic. Thus, A is A (Law of Identity: LOI) and A cannot be A and Non-A at the same time in the same manner (Law of Non-contradiction: LNC). What can supply the a priori truth conditions for these immutable laws? The Lord.

God your Savior … the Rock … (Isaiah 17:10).

Ultimately, a changeless, omniscient, omnipotent rational underpinning and infrastructure is required to understand and account for human experience: the immutable God. It is good news that Yahweh is the necessary constant that is required for the intelligibility of human experience.

God is the Truth

That by two immutable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie. … This hope we have as an anchor of the soul, both sure and steadfast… (Hebrews 6:18-19).

In contrast to Kantianism, I maintain that Yahweh furnishes all a priori essentials for the necessary epistemic equipment utilized in all knowledge and achievements. Yahweh has the actual ontic attributes of omniscience, immutability, and omnipotence (He has universal reach) thus He has the ontic capacity to be the ground for general principles, immutable laws, and universal operational aspects of human thinking and understanding. In Christian theism God can be known (John 17:1-3). Moreover, a position that rejects Yahweh as the epistemic (knowledge) base cannot be true, thus whatever evidence one discovers, must be discerned and processed with the rational tools that arise from Christian theism and the worldview that streams from the Triune God.

The true God is the elemental requirement for knowledge, proof, evidence, and logic. He is the a priori verity condition for the intelligibility of reality. This is the case inasmuch as the immaterial, transcendent, and immutable Triune God supplies the necessary pre-environment for the use of immaterial, transcendent, universal, and immutable laws of logic utilized in all knowledge pursuits including critical scrutiny. In principle, Kantianism cannot supply the necessary a priori truth conditions for the immutable universals (laws of logic, moral law, mathematical truths, etc.) hence it results in futility because of its internal weakness.

The Pre-essentials for Intelligibility

In Van Til’s view, only Christian theism provides the conditions that make such rational discourse possible. Therefore, the unbeliever’s very decision to argue against God refutes his position. The self-refutation is found not directly in the content of the assertion, but in the decision of a speaker to state that assertion (John Frame).

Kant’s view, valuable as it was, would, if tested by its own standard, defeat itself.17

Kantians presuppose the rational necessities that the Christian worldview underwrites while they verbally reject it. What are the obligatory conditions that make thought possible? The Triune God furnishes those preconditions to establish the rational flooring for intelligibility. Van Til called this “method of implication into the truth of God a transcendental method. That is, we must seek to determine what presuppositions are necessary to any object of knowledge in order that it may be intelligible to us.”18

Frame advocates God as the only suitable epistemic fount in his contrasting Kant with Van Til: “For Van Til, God is the Creator, the world is his creature. Over and over again in class Van Til would draw two circles on the blackboard: a large circle representing God and a smaller circle below represent­ing the creation. He insisted that Christianity has a “two-circle” worldview, as opposed to the “one-circle” worldview of secular thought. Secular thought makes all reality equal. If there is a god, he is equal to the world. But in Christianity God is the supreme Creator and therefore the supreme authority over all human thought. Kant told us to ignore the demands of any alleged revelation external to ourselves. Van Til tells us that the very essence of knowledge is to bring our thoughts into agreement with God’s revealed Word.” God has moral and epistemic authority since He is God; additionally He alone has the ontic attributes required to furnish the preconditions necessary for reason, objective moral values, and critical analysis.

Background Rational Assumptions

There must be many things we presuppose in order to offer critical analysis; all men come to the critical enterprise with some tacit understanding. All those basic assumptions make critical inquiry possible. And without presupposing the existence of God, one cannot account for analytic quests. Language and communication utilized within these quests would be impossible without the biblical God since analytical ventures utilize immutable universals (LNC, LOI, moral law, mathematical truths, etc.) which God grounds. One cause of Kantianism failure: it cannot account for the essential operational features of reason, thus it lacks explanatory power to account for analytical criticism.

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  1. Norman Kemp-Smith, trans. Immanuel Kant: Critique Of Pure Reason (NY: Bedford, 2008).
  2. Otfried Hoffe, Immanuel Kant, (Albany, NY: Suny, 1994), p. 32.
  3. Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P & R Publishing, 1998), p. 344.
  4. John Frame, Cornelius Van Til, www.frame-poythress.org/cornelius-van-til
  5. Leslie Stevenson, Ten Theories of Human Nature, (NY: Oxford, 2004),p. 114.
  6. Lewis White Back, Kant: Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, (Upper Saddle, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), p. 7.
  7. Stevenson, p. 115.
  8. Ibid.
  9. Bahnsen, p. 345.
  10. Frame.
  11. Stevenson, p. 115.
  12. Frame.
  13. Matthew Altman, A Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2008), p. 28.
  14. Book of Revelation 19:6-15, NKJV.
  15. The Triune God is absolutely required because He is unchanging, universal in knowledge, aspatial, transcendent, and immaterial; and the laws of logic are unchanging, universal, aspatial, transcendent, and immaterial. The laws of logic are necessary for all assertions, investigations, ethics, evidence, and knowledge; hence, Yahweh provides the indispensable a priori truth conditions to make sense of our world and experience.
  16. Edward J, Carnell, Introduction to Christian Apologetics, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1970), p. 330).
  17. Bahnsen, p. 354
  18. Ibid, see pp. 344-356 for Bahnsen’s analysis of Van Til’s view of Kantianism.

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Article by Mike Robinson, Granbury, Texas. Robinson is long time minister at Christ Covenant Church.

See my e-book Truth and the Reason for God. It contends for the sure existence of God. Find it HERE 

Atheistic Materialism’s Failure to Account for Enduring Personal Identity: Part II

If Everybody Gets Stoned It’s not Actually Everybody!

 

And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being (Genesis 2:7).

One problem for strict atheistic materialism is its failure to account for enduring personal identity over time; since the body undergoes constant intrinsic material change.

Ponder the following case:

  • Tom gets high smoking pot at night.
  • Tom is not high the following morning.

Under strict atheistic materialism Tom has undergone real change in his personal identity.

Within the ontological structure of materialism one is not able to classify that Tom is the one and the same person when high in the evening and sober the next morning. When Tom is high he is filled with material chemicals from smoking weed which changes the material structure of his body (as would food or liquid intake–or a big haircut!).

i. Tom-high is high while filled with material chemicals from smoking weed.
ii. Tom-sober is not high.

But Tom-high and Tom-not-high are assumed to be just substitute names for Tom. Yet in order for Tom to have not changed in his personal identity, it would have to be the case that Tom-high = Tom-not-high = Tom.

Thus, it apparently follows that under atheistic materialism:

iii. Tom is both high and not-high.

However, being high and not high are mutually irreconcilable properties. Accordingly, the materialistic atheist view of personal identity involves a contradiction: it implies that one and the same thing can be both t and not-t, for some property t.

The problem of materialistic atheism’s ontological stance and personal identity is produced by the presupposition:

1. For any h and t, if x is, was or will be t, then x is t.

If Tom is stoned at one time and not-stoned at another, then Tom is stoned and not-stoned; but being stoned and being not-stoned are mutually incompatible; hence, materialistic atheism’s view of personal identity over time, due to incessant intrinsic material change, involves a contradiction.

Owing to its denial of an immaterial aspect of personal identity (soul/spirit), atheistic materialism fails to account for enduring human identity over time.

Relentless Physical Change and Enduring Personal Identity

When someone says I am “Tom,” and he means he is the same “Tom,” as the person that is in his high school yearbook named “Tom,” he is borrowing from the Christian worldview. Christianity can give us a reason to be certain we are who we are from moment to moment; atheistic materialism cannot. Our physical body changes every hour and every day. Human beings lose one-sixtieth of an ounce of respiratory moisture and sweat every minute. There is a net loss every second. This means humans physically change every moment, hence under a physical-only worldview, I am not the same person I was a second ago.

The skin replaces itself once a month. The stomach lining is replaced every five days. The cells in the liver are replaced every six weeks, and the skeleton about every three months. The body of every human being constantly changes. The cells of a human body are in a constant state of flux, and are always being modified. In one year, the average person has ninety-eight percent of his atoms exchanged for new ones. In seven years’ time, every atom in a person’s body has been replaced by new ones. Thus the person is a new and completely different being, within the worldview of the materialist atheist (quicker if you get multiple body piercings).

“If the world were not as scripture says it is, if the natural man’s knowledge were not actually rooted in the creation and providence of God, then there would be no knowledge… The non-Christians have made and now make discoveries about the state of the universe simply because the universe is what Christ says it is. The unbelieving scientist borrows or steals the Christian principal of creation and providence every time he says that an “explanation” is possible, for he knows he cannot account for ‘explanation’ of his own” (Greg Bahnsen).

Who Was the Guy at My Wedding Next to My Wife?

The atheist who maintains that only the physical world exists is claiming that nothing spiritual or immaterial exists; this includes an enduring immaterial soul. Without an ongoing immaterial aspect of personhood, after seven years, everyone is a different person. So the atheist cannot account for personal identity. By his standard of a physical-only world, everyone is a different person after seven years because every physical atom has been swapped for new ones. If we consist of only physical matter, and are devoid of a soul, under the atheistic physical-only view, after our bodily atoms were completely exchanged for new ones, we would be different people.

The atheist, under his worldview, is not married to the woman he married nine years ago. They are totally different physically, due to the complete exchange of bodily atoms after seven years. If he has a child over the age of seven, under the atheist’s ontological position, the kid is not the same child that was born to them. Therefore, if he wanted to be consistent in his worldview, he should throw away all his baby pictures and their wedding album. Every molecule in his body has changed. And under a hard material-only worldview, he is a different person. Yet, he will not do that since he is tacitly basing much of his life on the Christian worldview.

The atheist husband still hugs his wife without being unfaithful to her, since Christianity is true. He will still take his kid to the park and buy him a balloon. But he will not buy the unknown kid who is next to him a balloon. The atheist knows that his child is the same child who was born to him years before because he has an enduring soul; a soul the Christian worldview maintains; hence the atheist lives much of his life upon the Christian worldview.

And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear Him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell (Mathew 10:28).

Can the information in one’s DNA be the basis for personal identity? No, since twins (and clones) have the same DNA but they are two different individuals. Additionally, even though it is highly improbable, two or more distinct men can have the same DNA and yet remain totally different individuals.

You Aren’t What You Eat

Under atheism, can the solely future Tom, and the solely present Tom, as well as the solely past Tom be the same person?

No.

Atheistic materialism makes no ontological provision for enduring personal identity over time since men in flux will have different material parts and composition with dissimilar material properties.

Next time your atheist friend tries to take a large bite of his Big Mac, stop him with the warning that he is, not only damaging his health, he is changing his identity with each bite. Bon Appetit.

That He [God] would grant you, according to the riches of His glory, to be strengthened with might through His Spirit in the inner man (Ephesians 3:16).

And Never get high on dope, instead read my new E-book: Ontology: Studies in Christian Thought and Apologetic Applications HERE

or the paperback Truth, Knowledge and the Reason for God here

Part One of Atheism Fails to Account for Enduring Personal Identity is HERE

Your thoughts and comments are encouraged:

Creatio ex Deo and Pantheism: Maverick Philosopher

Creatio ex Deo and Pantheism

The following post draws mainly upon Robert Oakes, “Does Traditional Theism Entail Pantheism?” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 1 (January 1983), pp. 105-112. Reprinted in Tom Morris, ed. The Concept of God (Oxford U. Press, 1987).
The question arises:   Does my construal of creatio ex nihilo in terms of creatio ex Deo commit me to pantheism? If so, how does that comport with my avowed onto-theological personalism? I will try toshow that my construal does not commit me to pantheism, or at least not to the pantheism that Oakes seems to embrace.

The logically first question concerns just what pantheism is and is not. I’ll begin with what it is not.

A. Pantheism worth discussing is not the view that God (G) is identical to the physical universe (U). For that would amount to saying that God does not exist. Whether or not God exists, the divine nature excludes the possibility of God’s being a system of physical objects. The reduction of G to U thus amounts to the elimination of G. Therefore, the use of ‘God’ to refer to U is simply an egregious misuse of the term ‘God,’ a misuse on a par with Tillich’s misuse of ‘God’ to refer to one’s ultimate concern.

B. What of the opposite reduction of U to G? This is also a type of pantheism not worth discussing: it implies that God exists but the physical universe does not. For it is self-evident that the physical universe cannot exist unless it is in some sense distinct from G. After all, G is immutable whereas U is mutable; hence, by what McTaggart calls the Discernibility of the Diverse (the logical contrapositive of the Indiscernibility of Identicals), U cannot be identical to G if both exist.

C. If pantheism is to be worth discussing, it must somehow allow for a difference of some kind between God and the cosmos. It must steer a middle course between a strict identity of G and U and a type of difference that would render them ‘indifferent’ to each other, i.e., a type of radical difference that would allow the possibility of U existing without G existing. A viable pantheism must therefore avoid three positions: (1) God is world-identical; (2) The world is God-identical; (3) God and the world are externally related in the sense that either could exist without the other.

One way to satisfy these requirements is by saying, Spinozistically, that created entities are modes of God, or as Oakes says, “aspects or modifications” of God. (p. 106 et passim) For if x is a mode (aspect, modification) of y, then x is not identical to y, y is not identical to x, and x and y are not merely externally related.

It is important to realize that classical theism must also satisfy the requirements, (1)-(3). In particular, classical theism must deny that U can exist without G. For it is a central tenet of classical theism that God is not merely a cause of the inception of the universe, but a cause of its continuance as well. God is not merely a deistic ‘starter-upper,’ but a moment by moment conserver. How exactly creatio originans and creatio continuans fit together involves problems that cannot be discussed in this post.  (Cf. William F. Vallicella (2002), The Creation–Conservation Dilemma and Presentist Four-DimensionalismReligious Studies 38 (2):187-200.)  But there can be no doubt that for classical theism as it is found in Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley and others, creation in the full sense involves both notions, both originating creation and continuing creation. …

Note that if x is an aspect or modification of y, then x cannot exist without y, but y can exist without x. (A carpet wrinkle cannot exist without the carpet of which it is the wrinkle, but the carpet can surely exist without that, or any, wrinkle.) By contrast, if x is the intentional object of act y, then x cannot exist without y, AND y cannot exist without x. An imagining cannot exist except as the imagining of a definite object, and that object, qua intentional object, cannot exist without the act. I conclude from this difference that the intentional object cannot be an aspect or modification of the act. It is not a property of the act, but its object or intentum. A fortiori, it cannot be an aspect or modification of the subject of the act, the imaginer in the case of an act of imagining.  …

The Argument from Conservation therefore fails, and classical theism does not collapse into pantheism. …
to Continue Reading: http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2012/01/creatio-ex-deo-and-pantheism.html

 

Alvin Plantinga on Modal Possibility of Mind/Body Dualism

Alvin Plantinga’s Argument on Modal Possibility of the Soul Distinct from the Body

See Video at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WOTn_wRwDE0

1.

p (possibly me having a distinct property that my body lacks [me possible in a beetle’s body])
q (all possible properties of my body are the same as me)

p V q
~q
∴ p

 

2.
p (it is possible for me to have a property my body can’t have)
q (then I am not identical to my body)

p –> q
p
∴q
3.
I.

 

b = my body
m = me (my identity)
i (◊ m is found in a beetle’s body)
o (~◊ m is found in a beetle’s body)

i V o
~o
∴ i

II.
f (~ ◊ that b can be found outside itself)

e (◊ that b can be found outside itself)

f  V e
~ e
∴ f

 

—-

And this seemingly odd idea of having a beetle’s body applies to all men now inasmuch as all men have different bodies through time and change. Strict materialism seems to imply that since men physically change every moment, as new physical material is added to the body through breathing and eating while losing body parts through exhaling and bowel movements, to maintain personal identity across time there must be an unchanging immaterial aspect of men: the soul. Moreover, after seven years men have exchanged almost 100% of their material atoms and replaced them with new ones, yet their identity remains the same. A man’s identity is distinct from his mere physical body/brain.

——

also see my review of Keith Ward’s book: More Than Matter

My E-book Aristotle, Frege, Logic and God may be of interest HERE

or paperback Here

Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism: Link

Plantinga’s article confutes Naturalism HERE      

 

 

 

 

Horton’s New Systematic Theology: Book Review

Book Review: The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way (Hardcover).

 

Review by Mike Robinson.

Michael Horton is like technology; he’s been improving our lives for decades now.
Ponder all his fine work on the White Horse Inn, ACE, and his numerous books. And what did he get for it all?
A professorship at a small Reformed seminary complete with some listless students (and some sharp and eager ones too!).
Mostly Dr. Horton toils for the glory of God–and that is just one powerful reason his work has made such a significant impact.
And in The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way the good professor offers an interesting and modern work of Systematic Theology. This volume is large, but breezy; yes a ST that is a smooth and engaging read!
.
The Fondation of the Covenants 
.
Horton is always covenantally focused and notes that “we were created by God as inherently covenantal creatures–in relationship with God and each other, and redemption restores this extroverted identity…” (p. 27). He reveals his main objective: “There is one faith–the Christian faith–and this volume is an attempt to explore that faith as it is summarized in the confession of Reformed Christianity” (p. 30).
.
Dr. Horton does not attempt to avoid theological, philosophical, or epistemological concepts as he posits: “The widest horizon for theology–indeed for all of our knowledge–is the question of ontology: what is reality?” (p. 36). And that “Western atheism rejects any transcendent reality beyond the world of sense experience” (p. 39). He presses the need to understand the most essential antithesis for his “model assumes that God and the world are distinct–Creator and creation. The world is dependent on God, but God is independent of the world” (p. 41). Yet the “triune God created us to share in His drama, not in His essence” (p. 44). Horton takes knowledge to depend on the triune God for “epistemology depends on ontology” (p. 47). What one knows, can know, and warrant depend on God’s ontic status and not the other way around. Men must “recognize there is no such thing as a neutral epistemological method. We always presuppose a certain view of reality before we ask how to investigate it” (p. 49). Epistemic and ontic issues can be very complicated and tricky, and although the author may offer some hazy distinctions, he provides a respectable account for most of his positions (he is a professor of apologetics at WTS).
This modest presuppositionally-leaning ST includes:
I. Knowing God: The Presupposition of Theology Dissonant Dramas: Paradigms for Knowing God and the World The Character of Theology The Source of Theology: Scripture Scripture as Covenant Canon
II. The God Who Lives God: The Incommunicable Attributes God: The Communicable Attributes The Trinity
III. God Who Creates The Decree: Trinity and Predestination Creation Providence The Fall
IV. The God Who Rescues
V. God Who Reigns in Grace Called to be Saints Union with Christ Forensic Aspects of Union with Christ: Justification and Adoption Sanctification and Perseverance The Kingdom of Grace and the New Covenant Church Word and Sacrament Baptism and the Lord’s Supper

VI. God Who Reigns in Glory

VII. and plenty more.

Systematic Theology and the Christian Worldview

 

The author adds that central to a “biblical worldview, over against its rivals, is the qualitative distinction between God and the world. This distinction holds with respect not only to ontology, but epistemology. In His existence and knowledge, God transcends us. … Only the triune God is eternal, infinite, and omniscient. And yet, God is not only transcendent in majesty, but immanent in loving in his covenantal condensation” (p. 77).

Language and Theology

 

Horton discusses language in relation to the Word of God: speech involves assertives, directives, expressives, declarations, and other illocutionary acts (p. 121). And he offers a fine exposition of that which he is famous for: the basic distinction within God’s Word of “Law and Gospel” pp. 135-154) with quotes to that end from Calvin, Bavinck, Murray, etc. Regarding Scripture “the Trinitarian character of divine communication is crucial” in “general and special revelation” (p. 158).

Also included:

  • Horton discusses approaches, models and, methodology in undertaking Christian theology
  • The author’s theological approach is Reformed Redemptive-historical
  • He concentrates on various facets of modern theology
  • Horton contrasts Christian orthodoxy with several heterodox theological views
  • He utilizes a covenantal framework (influenced by Meredith Kline)
  • The professor rebuts sundry facets of liberal and postmodern theology.

He goes on to define Verbal-Plenary Inspiration as well as the relationship between divine and human agency in God’s revelation (pp. 160-163). Forasmuch as the source of VPI is “in the triune God.” Later he discusses various views of inerrancy including the Princeton formulation (pp. 176-178). The study of scripture is essential, however “the methodological assumptions of textual criticism are quite different from those of higher criticism, which as an apparatus of theological liberalism follows naturalistic presuppositions” (p. 180). We must always remember that whatever “the holy, unerring, and faithful Father speaks is–simply by virtue of having come from him–holy, unerring, and faithful” (p. 184). As Anthanasius wrote, “holy Scripture is of all things most sufficient for us” (p. 194).

Professor Horton discusses the incommunicable attributes of God:
  •  Simplicity: As infinite spirit, God is not made up of different parts; His attributes are identical with his being.
  • Aseity: Self-existence (from-himself-ness, a-se, absolute); independence from the creation (Isaiah 40:8-18); I Am Who I Am (Exodus 3:14); god is life; he gives life (Psalm 115:3). He adds Bavinck’s words that God is “unbounded, limitless, and absolutely undetermined.”
  • Immutability: Unchangeableness.
  • Impassibility: Incapacity for being overwhelmed by suffering (James 1:17; Psalm 102:25-27; Mal. 3:6).
  • Eternity (Psalm 90:2, 102:12; Eph. 3:21): God’s transcendence of time (pp. 226-258) for God is omnitemporal in the way He is omnipresent.

 

This large ST covers aspects of the work of:
  • Calvin
  • Duns Scotus
  • Aquinas
  • Turretin (theology “treats God not like metaphysics … but as the Creator and Redeemer”). Augustine
  • Beza
  • Rahner (Rahner advocates for some SV Council doctrines).
  • Plato (Dr. Horton asserts that “the biblical faith is opposed to any notion of a world emanating from God’s essence, with divine souls thrown mercilessly into bodies and the realm of appearances” along with a separate “world of forms”).
  • Berkhof
  • N.T. Wright’s (he refutes Wright’s novel view of Justification (pp. 639-641).
  • Bavinck
  • Vos (“the concept of knowledge is not Hellenistic” but covenantal).
  • Polanyi (like Augustine “faith seeking understanding” p. 102-106).
  • Grudem
  • Hodge
  • Kant
  • Hume
  • Van Til (Creator-creature distinction; i.e., archetypal-ectypal).
  • Descartes
  • Hegel (for him “everything that exists in reality is rational”).
  • Torrence
  • Some Puritans
  • And many others including interacting with and critiquing the work of unorthodox theologians.

 

The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way is practical, yet almost devotional as Horton outlines “doctrine, doxology, discipleship, and redemptive drama”; perfect for busy pastors, seminary students, and even most laypeople.
Recommended by:
  • Kevin Vanhoozer
  • David Wells
  • Bryan Chapell
  • R.C. Sproul
  • And other erudite scholars.
                                                                
Conclusion
 
 
In The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way one discovers an exceedingly useful and valuable tool for appraising an extensive range of Christian doctrinal and life matters, with an opportunity to evaluate various viewpoints in the process and to ascertain the supporting biblical data for each. I appreciate Dr. Horton’s depth of understanding, simplicity, and lucidity. This large volume has aided my research and devotional life. You may not be Reformed, nonetheless don’t let that deter you from buying this extremely well documented and annotated educational and spiritual storehouse. You may not agree with all of Horton’s positions, but the understanding you gain will be of prodigious profit.
also see my New Apologetic new Ebook or Paperback:
                                                                                                        ————————–

Dr. Horton has won the 2012 Christianity Today book award for best theology/ethics text for this volume.

The award states, “averting his gaze from the kind of popular evangelicalism that is nondenominational in style and never quite confessional in ethos, Horton delivers the Reformed goods to a new generation.”

Why???Young Man Graduates then is Snatched by Tornado out of Car

short excerpt of the AP story:

Two Joplin parents whose son was headed home from his high school graduation when he was sucked away by a deadly tornado are beginning to heal as they head into the first holiday season without him. Will Norton’s body wasn’t found until five days after the May 22 tornado hit. The EF5 twister packed 200 mph winds and killed 161 people. During the search, the horrific story captivated the nation. The storm pulled Will Norton out of the family’s sport utility vehicle as his father tried to hold onto him. “How could you be at graduation, one of the happiest days of your life, and then have a cloud come down out of nowhere and suck you up out of a car?” asks Trish Norton, Will’s mother, with a rueful shake of her head. “He wasn’t driving drunk. He wasn’t doing anything he wasn’t supposed to. … He was just coming home from graduation. Unfair.”

Full article HERE    

so this begs the question: Why?

 

 

God is Good: God is Great: Why Believing in God Is Reasonable & Responsible by William Craig

God is Good: God is Great review by Mike A Robinson

Face it, reading philosophy isn’t always merriment. (That’s why it’s often called obscure and arduous.) But you might enjoy studying philosophy more if the books you take up are more like God is Good: God is Great: Why Believing in God Is Reasonable & Responsible, edited by William Lane Craig and Chad Meister.

Atheists get it all wrong, according to the contributors and they make great strides in proving such. Additionally the writers within this compilation are focused on not just refuting atheism, but contending for Christian Theism (CT). Even though “atheism is on the decline worldwide” (p. 7), God is Good was produced to answer the New Atheists (NAs) and further the growth of CT. The editors agree with McGrath that the NAs produce “tired, weak, and recycled arguments” (p. 9).

Craig begins the volume with an essay that devastates Dawkins’ book as he rationally upholds the cosmological argument (14-18), the moral argument (18-19), the teleological argument (20-24), and the ontological argument, including Plantinga’s contribution to the OA (28-30).

Additionally Craig defends the following syllogism:

1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance or design.
2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
3. Therefore, it is due to design. Craig cogently argues that this must be the case as he attempts to justify the many presuppositions within the premises of this syllogism.

God is Good contains many fine essays and one of the most laudable is from J.P. Moreland.

Dr. Moreland maintains:

1. If naturalism is true, there is no irreducible teleology.
2. Rational deliberation exhibits irreducible teleology.
3. Therefore naturalism is false.

Within that argument Moreland contends for “unified selves” (42), “intrinsic, equal value and rights” (44), and consciousness.

There are numerous excellent chapters within this readable book (upper high school or early college level) including:

• God and Physics: John Polkinghorne
• Evil: Chad Meister
• Are OT Laws Evil?: Paul Copan
• The Resurrection: Gary Habermas
• The Dawkins Confusion: Plantinga’s Devastating Refutation of Dawkins (he demonstrates that Dawkins and the NAs run through countless philosophical and epistemic Stop Signs; that the NAs lack even basic philosophical acumen: Plantinga’s essay alone is worth the price of this volume).
• And additional outstanding material.

Craig notes: “The overall case for recognizing and experiencing the Bible as God’s living word will depend on your overall view of nature, history, and values” (William Craig, p. 186).

Plantinga exposes Dawkins philosophical failings: “Now despite the fact that this book [Dawkins’ book The God Delusion] is mainly philosophical, Dawkins is not a philosopher, he’s a biologist. Even taking this into account, however, much of the philosophy he purveys is at best jejune. You might say that some of his forays into philosophy are at best sophomoric, but that would be unfair to sophomores; the fact is … any of his arguments would receive a failing grade in as sophomore philosophy class. This combined with the arrogant, smarter-than-thou tone of the book, can be annoying” (Alvin Plantinga, p. 213).

Habermas adds: “The reports of Buddha and Krishna come hundreds of years afterward [after the Resurrection of Christ]. No other major religious founders in ancient times were ever crucified. Further, it cannot be demonstrated that there is even a single pagan resurrection account prior to Jesus, whether mythological or historical” (Gary Habermas, p. 213).
The penetrating analysis within this volume may not sluice from my own apologetic method or epistemic commitments, but much of this work is astute, keen, loaded with cognoscitive discernment and perspicacity.

—— See the dynamic new book on apologetics:
[[ASIN:1432765914 Truth, Knowledge and the Reason for God: The Defense of the Rational Assurance of Christianity]] HERE

Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency: Book Review

Timothy O’Connor (Professor: Philosophy, Indiana University) delivers a fascinating and innovative new volume: “Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency.” Professor O’Conner presents the reader with a fine overview of philosophy, metaphysics, with an aim toward philosophical theology. Herein O’Conner provides a fine leap into various unexplored regions (not fully metaphysically surveyed) within philosophical religion; the examination and application thereof. The author partitions this volume into two chief divisions as he explores the truth and relationship relating to that which is possible and/or necessary. He then proceeds to posit a coherent metaphysical structure that seeks to advance an “ultimate explanation.”

This volume may be a bit pricey, nonetheless the reader receives much more than what he paid in dollars; a unique, provocative, and I affirm, compelling work which discloses captivating conjectures concerning an ultimate explanation of the cosmos and human experience.

Alexander Pruss opines: “This is a superb book in the philosophy of religion, the like of whose quality and originality is rare.”

 

Chapters include:

  •   The Explanatory Role of Necessity:
  • Modality and Explanation
  • An Epistemological Worry About Modality: Causal Contact With Modal Facts
  • Modal Nihilism
  • Modal Reductionism and Deflationism
  • Modal Anti-Realism and Quasi-Realism

 

    The Necessary Shape of Contingency: 

  • Ultimate Explanation and Necessary Being: The Existence Stage of the Cosmological Argument
  • Necessary Being as the Explanatory Ground of Contingency?
  • From Necessary Being to God, I: Transcendent, Not Immanent
  • From Necessary Being to God, II: Logos, not Random Chaos
  • Necessary Being and the Scope of Possibility
  • Necessary Being and the Many Necessary Truths
  • The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Anselm?
  • Natural Theology in the Understanding of Revealed Theology
     and much more.

 

This volume has some technical language, but with concentration most college grads should gain comprehension of this essential topic.

Also see my book that contends for theism utilizing the necessity of Reason and Knowledge:
http://www.amazon.com/Truth-Knowledge-Reason-God-Christianity/dp/1432765914